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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FIRST AMENDMENT—SOCIAL MEDIA RAMS 
THE TINKER SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: A NEW APPROACH FOR ONLINE 
STUDENT SPEECH 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Rapid advances in computer technology and the Internet have contrib-
uted to vast transformations in the way Americans work, learn, and com-
municate. Technologies now allow students to talk with astronauts in space,1 
interact with children from other parts of the world,2 and even defy geo-
graphic boundaries to raise awareness and funds for the needy.3 While the 
Internet provides the classroom with the capability to make enormous 
strides, it has also become a burden that administrators and teachers must 
treat with much caution and some skepticism.  
Social commentator Jon Stewart once noted that “[t]he Internet is just a 
world passing around notes in a classroom,”4 and sometimes, whether we 
like it or not, school administrators must stop the note passing. Before the 
advent of the Internet, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,5 that students did 
not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate.”6 But student internet speech defies the boundaries 
originally conceived by the Court, and, as a result, Tinker’s schoolhouse 
gate7 is now largely metaphorical. Nevertheless, the reality of intrusive and 
offensive internet speech must be promptly reckoned with by school admin-
istrators to maintain order within the classroom. Unfortunately, courts have 
failed to adequately create or endorse a comprehensive assessment that not 
  
 1. E.g., Elaine M. Marconi, Communication from Space Inspires Young Minds, NASA 
(Jul. 30, 2008), http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/behindscenes/ariss.html.  
 2. E.g., Rodolfo Roman, Technology links Miami Classroom with Kids in China, 
RODOLFOROMAN.COM (May 25, 2011), http://rodolforoman.com/technology-links-miami-
classroom-with-kids-in-china/. 
 3. E.g., Beth Sussman, Students Use the Internet to Help Darfur, USA TODAY (June 
13, 2007, 8:21 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2007-06-12-darfurstudents_N 
.htm.   
 4. Josh Monza, 5 Reasons Technology in the Classroom Engages Students, SECUREDGE 
NETWORK (Dec. 20, 2010, 7:44 AM), http://www.securedgenetworks.com/secure-edge-net 
works-blog/bid/51752/5-Reasons-Technology-in-the-Classroom-Engages-Students.   
 5. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 6. Id. at 506. 
 7. Id. 
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only caters exclusively to various forms of online student speech but also 
maintains a flexible nature that can stand the test of time.8     
Past student-speech cases set the initial stage for formulating a test that 
adequately balances the right of student expression and the need for admin-
istrative control.9 A thorough understanding of how circuits have thus far 
approached the matter provides insight as to what interests are at stake and 
illustrates why both students and administrators are rightly concerned about 
the future legal implications of online student speech.10 Using prior prece-
dent’s current application, pitfalls, and ongoing conflicts as a foundation, 
this note advocates for a two-prong test that has the ability to break the cur-
rent cycle of case-by-case consideration, which will eventually cripple the 
system and leave administrators and students with more questions than an-
swers.11 While others have philosophized on the possible ramifications of 
sanctioning online student speech,12 or advocated for tests13 that continue to 
evaluate this new medium solely under the past classifications of Tinker, 
Morse v. Frederick,14 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,15 and Bethel 
  
 8. See infra Part III (discussing the inadequacy of current remedies applied by various 
courts). 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. See, e.g., Joseph A. Tomain, Cyberspace is Outside the Schoolhouse Gate: Offen-
sive, Online Student Speech Receives First Amendment Protection, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 97, 
178–80 (2010) (arguing that Fraser’s standard should not apply to online student speech as it 
would only treat the consequences of such speech as opposed to the causes); Emily Gold 
Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School Officials and the Limits of 
School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591, 659 (2011) (noting that the distinction 
between harassment and dissent should be the causal factor in determining whether students 
should be punished for their off-campus speech and supporting state anti-harassment and 
anti-cyber-bullying laws to combat the problem but failing to propose a test that courts, ad-
ministrators, and students alike could use in evaluating speech prior to its dissemination). 
 13. Such tests do little to help students and administrators alike decide, prior to litiga-
tion, whether their actions are reasonable, thus inadequately prevent unnecessary court inter-
vention in matters. See Benjamin T. Bradford, Comment, Is It Really MySpace? Our Dis-
jointed History of Public School Discipline for Student Speech Needs a New Test for an 
Online Era, 3 J. MARSHALL L.J. 323, 340 (2010) (proposing that courts evaluate three factors 
prior to determining whether Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or Morse are even triggered); see 
also Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering with Students’ Rights: The Need for An Enhanced 
First Amendment Standard to Protect Off-Campus Student Internet Speech, 36 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 129, 156–57 (2007) (proposing that internet speech, absent intentional or reckless dis-
tribution by the student on campus, be considered off-campus speech, and thus unreachable 
by school administrators, then advocating the application of the Tinker standard once distri-
bution is proved). Furthermore, evaluation methods that tie administrators’ hands with a pure 
Tinker standard will be short-lived due to the increasing availability and ability of technolo-
gy. 
 14. 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).  
 15. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
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School District No. 403 v. Fraser,16 this two-prong test fills the unique void 
that the Internet has created in the legal doctrine of student-speech and ex-
pression cases. The proposed test maintains the foundations of early student-
speech cases, while also extending protections to reach the various natures 
and subsequent problems associated with online student speech. 
II. AN ADEQUATE FOUNDATION: TINKER, FRASER, KUHLMEIER, AND MORSE 
While the Supreme Court of the United States has yet to address what 
abilities, if any, public school administrators have to regulate online student 
speech, the founding student speech cases provide some guidance as to what 
considerations the Court may consider when formulating a test. Additional-
ly, these four pivotal cases lay the foundation for a test that would specifi-
cally address the rampant issue of online student speech that crosses onto 
school grounds and interferes with the mission of the school.17 
A. Tinker’s Substantial Disruption Test 
In Tinker, a group of high school students planned to wear black arm-
bands to school in protest of the Vietnam War.18 School administrators, up-
on learning of the plan to wear the armbands, adopted a policy that would 
result in punishment for students that refused to remove them.19 Ultimately, 
three students followed through with the plan and were suspended for refus-
ing to comply with the policy.20 In perhaps one of the most quoted lines in 
First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court noted that “[n]either 
students [n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech 
or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”21 Ultimately, the Court found that 
the students were allowed to wear the armbands to school in protest against 
the Vietnam conflict, as political speech is considered the highest form of 
protected speech,22 but only so long as it did not cause substantial disruption 
within the school.23 
  
 16. 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).  
 17. These four cases followed the Supreme Court’s holding in West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette, which first recognized student speech rights by holding that 
a school could not force students to participate in the pledge of allegiance. 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943). 
 18. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
 19. Id. at 504. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 506. 
 22. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (“Core political speech 
occupies the highest, most protected position. . .”). 
 23. Id. at 510–11. This holding resulted in what courts and commentators have often 
referred to as the “substantial disruption test.” Id. 
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In crafting the original student-speech test, the Court relied on the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding in the case Burnside v. Byars.24 In Burnside, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the banning of “Freedom Buttons” worn by students was arbi-
trary and unreasonable because the buttons did not materially and substan-
tially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline for the suc-
cessful operation of the school.25 Notably, in holding that school officials 
could not forbid the students in Tinker from wearing armbands, the Court 
emphasized that the speech at issue was a “silent, passive expression of 
opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of peti-
tioners.”26 Additionally, Tinker placed an emphasis on the schoolhouse gate, 
which demonstrates the Court’s deference to speech that affects the school 
environment.27 
B. Fraser’s Lewd and Vulgar Requirement 
After Tinker, it was clear that “pure” or “symbolic” on-campus speech 
would not be actionable by school officials, so long as it did not substantial-
ly disrupt the school’s operations.28 Not long thereafter, however, the Court 
held that the constitutional rights of students in a public school are not au-
tomatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.29 The 
Court’s holding in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser recognized that 
the freedom to advocate controversial views must be balanced by the socie-
tal interest of teaching students appropriate behavior.30 In Fraser, school 
administrators punished a student for including an “elaborate, graphic, and 
explicit sexual metaphor” in a student election speech held on campus.31 
Opining that a public high school was no place for a sexually explicit mes-
sage, the Court found it perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate32 
  
 24. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 25. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749. 
 26. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
 27. Id. at 511. The Court found that 
[a] student’s rights . . . do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is 
in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized 
hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the con-
flict in Vietnam, if he does so without “materially and substantially interfering 
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school” 
and without colliding with the rights of others. 
Id. at 512–13. The Court further noted that speech that crossed those boundaries however, 
was “not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.” Id. at 513.  
 28. Id. at 517. 
 29. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
 30. Id. at 681. 
 31. Id. at 678. 
 32. Originally, the student was told he would be suspended for three days and his name 
would be removed from the list of candidates eligible to speak at the school commencement 
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itself in order to demonstrate that vulgar speech and lewd conduct are whol-
ly inconsistent with the fundamental values of public school education.33 
Factually, Fraser is distinguishable from Tinker in that the student speech at 
issue was not political speech but rather vulgar and lewd speech.34 Fraser 
specifically determined that student speech that was plainly offensive, lewd, 
or indecent had no place in schools and, therefore, could be categorically 
limited.35 
C. Kuhlmeier and Morse Have Continued a Trend of Granting More 
Regulatory Control to School Officials in Special Circumstances 
After deciding Tinker and Fraser, the Court continued a trend of plac-
ing restrictions on student speech when it allowed school officials to exer-
cise prior restraint of student expression as long as such restraint was rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns of the school.36 In Ha-
zelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, a principal censored articles in the 
school newspaper that contained, among other topics, information about 
three high-school students’ experiences with pregnancy.37 The principal 
believed that, even though the pregnancy article used false names, the iden-
tity of the young women could be deduced, and furthermore, the article it-
self contained sexual references that were inappropriate for younger stu-
dents.38 The Court held that the principal’s actions were reasonable and did 
not violate student speech rights.39 
The trend of favoring necessary restrictions on student speech contin-
ued in Morse v. Frederick when the Court extended administrative control 
of student speech to an off-campus function.40 In Morse, the Court held that 
school administrators were justified in confiscating a student sign displaying 
the words, “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at an off-campus, school-related func-
tion because not doing so could send the wrong message to other students.41 
The school officials in Morse believed that the speech advocated for illegal 
drug use and, therefore, was contrary to “the school’s educational mission to 
educate students about the dangers of illegal drugs and to discourage their 
  
ceremony. Id. Ultimately however, the student only served two days of the suspension. Id. at 
679.  
 33. Id. at 685–86. 
 34. Id. at 685. 
 35. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686. 
 36. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 263. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
 41. Id. 
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use.”42 Morse reveals that the Court recognizes that administrators have a 
need to maintain an element of control in certain off-campus circumstances, 
which consequently justifies punishment of those students.43  
D. Lessons from Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse 
While Tinker set the initial physical boundary for actionable student 
speech, Fraser established that administrators can limit students’ First 
Amendment rights when that boundary is crossed. Kuhlmeier expressed the 
Court’s legitimate concern for maintaining a harmonious school environ-
ment while Morse demonstrated that administrative power extends to stu-
dent speech that occurs off-campus. Perhaps this extension touches on the 
social desire or responsibility that society thrusts upon public schools to, in 
some fashion, mold today’s children into productive citizens of tomorrow.44 
The sum of these cases supports the conclusion that school officials 
have the authority to limit some student speech.45 None of these cases, how-
ever, take into consideration the special concerns involved with internet 
speech, or what abilities school administrators may have to regulate this 
speech in order to maintain an environment that fosters their educational 
purpose. 
III. THE INTERNET’S SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
It may be true that in its original context, the physical bounds of the 
school created the ultimate barrier between on- and off-campus speech.46 
For better or for worse, however, the schoolhouse gate is largely a meta-
phorical representation of the school in its entirety, including its educational 
mission, and this language should be strictly construed. 
  
 42. Id. at 399. The Court noted the distinction between this message and protected polit-
ical speech advocating a change in drug laws. Id. The Superintendent noted that the student 
“was not advocating the legalization of marijuana or promoting a religious belief. He was 
displaying a fairly silly message promoting illegal drug usage in the midst of a school activi-
ty.” Id. 
 43. Id. at 397. 
 44. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (discussing socie-
ty’s desire for schools to teach children socially acceptable behavior). 
 45. This power currently only extends to on-campus speech that is substantially disrup-
tive or vulgar and lewd. Additionally, off-campus speech can be limited when it relates to a 
school function and is in conflict with a school’s pedagogical message. See supra notes 32–
34 and accompanying text. 
 46. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
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A. The Harmonious Educational Environment 
Schools, as instruments of the state,47 may determine that the essential 
lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that toler-
ates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct.48 While it is important 
to recognize student speech rights, it is also necessary for public schools to 
have the administrative power necessary to maintain a harmonious educa-
tional environment.49  
The United States Supreme Court has taken notice of the conflicting 
nature of both student-speech rights and the school’s duty to be a principle 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, preparing him for later 
professional training, and helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment.50 In order to accomplish these missions, schools strive to keep class-
rooms focused and keep students’ minds on schoolwork instead of gossip.51 
Therefore, when student speech crosses onto school grounds, administrators 
dutifully take steps to ensure that the speech does not materially and sub-
stantially disrupt the school environment.52  
B. A Pervasive Problem with Inadequate Remedies 
Following the Supreme Court’s holding in Tinker, many courts have 
been asked to address whether speech that originated off-campus but, 
through some means, crossed onto schoolhouse grounds was at all actiona-
ble by school administrators. For instance, the First Circuit held that a stu-
dent’s suspension was proper when a “Shit List,” though created off-
campus, found its way onto campus.53 Conversely, the Fifth Circuit held that 
  
 47. It should be noted that this note focuses on the rights of students in public school 
environments. Private schools have a greater ability to set limits, restraints, and regulations 
on their students, including speech rights. See Vanessa Ann Countryman, School Choice 
Programs Do Not Render Participant Private Schools “State Actors”, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
525, 528 (2004) (stating that “Private schools are private actors: they may act as they choose, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment will offer no protection to those affected by a private organi-
zation’s actions.”). 
 48. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 51. See generally School Mission Statements, MISSIONSTATEMENTS.COM, http://www. 
missionstatements.com/school_mission_statements.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). This 
website provides a variety of sample school mission statements from universities, prep 
schools, and public schools. The statements generally indicate that the focus of the school 
should be on education and preparing the student’s mind for the world. See id. 
 52. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
 53. Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14, 15–16 (1st Cir. 1995). The list in question had 120 
names with “one or more lines of crude descriptions of character and/or behavior” Id. at 16. 
The court also noted that the descriptions for the juniors and seniors on the list contained 
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school officials could not punish a student for a violent sketch, created off-
campus two years prior, that was inadvertently brought to campus by anoth-
er student.54 This decision marked the second time the Fifth Circuit was con-
fronted with student speech originating off-campus. In a prior decision, 
Shanley v. Northeast Independent School District,55 the Fifth Circuit ruled 
that an underground student newspaper, which was produced and distributed 
off-campus, did not merit administrative intrusions.56 In a similar off-
campus student-newspaper case however, the Seventh Circuit reached a 
different conclusion.57 In Boucher v. School Board of School District of 
Greenfield,58 the Seventh Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction that had 
been granted in favor of a student who, using a newspaper that had been 
created off-campus, advocated hacking the school computer systems.59 The 
court emphasized that the unique nature of what was being advocated 
threatened to interfere with the day-to-day mission and business of the 
school.60 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit agreed that school administration could 
suspend a student for writing a poem that depicted school violence, even 
though the poem was written off-campus, because it was subsequently 
shown to a teacher.61 The court reasoned that the school had a duty to pre-
vent any potential violence on campus and that this duty outweighed any of 
the student’s First Amendment rights that were possibly infringed.62 Arkan-
sas’s own federal circuit has also addressed off-campus speech that creeps 
pasts Tinker’s gate.63 In Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District,64 the 
Eighth Circuit held that a student could be disciplined for a letter threatening 
rape and murder, even though composed off-campus, because the letter was 
nonetheless eventually brought to campus by another student.65 While these 
cases all address off-campus student speech that was subsequently brought 
  
“epithets that were not merely insulting as to appearance, but suggestive, often explicitly so, 
of sexual capacity, proclivity, and promiscuity.” Id. 
 54. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619–21 (5th Cir. 2004). Even 
though the court held that the student was protected by the First Amendment, the court never-
theless determined that the school administrator had qualified immunity against the claim. Id. 
at 621. 
 55. 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 56. Id. at 965–71. 
 57. Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 826 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 822, 826. 
 60. Id. at 827–28. 
 61. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 62. Id. at 989. 
 63. See Doe v. Pulaski Co. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 624–25 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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onto campus, none conclusively advocates for a test to confront such issues 
in the future.  
As the Internet becomes more widely used by students, it becomes a 
tool that students use to express themselves.66 In the only student-internet-
speech case to reach a state supreme court, J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem 
Area School District,67 the court found that the creation of webpages off-
campus, which “contained derogatory, profane, offensive and threatening 
statements directed toward one of the student’s teachers and his principal,”68 
constituted on-campus speech.69 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that 
when speech is aimed at a specific school or its personnel and is brought 
onto the school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech 
should be considered on-campus speech.70 The reasoning in Bethlehem is 
sound because it notes the inevitability that student internet speech that tar-
gets a school and is then intentionally distributed to its students will create 
disruption on-campus.71  
While some district courts have also dealt with the issue of what types 
of off-campus speech can be regulated by school administrators, there is no 
clear favored standard, test, or viewpoint.72  In fact, only the Fourth and Se-
cond circuit courts have conclusively addressed the specific issue of whether 
online student speech can be analyzed under the traditional on-campus 
framework.73 In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central 
School District,74 the Second Circuit concluded that the mere nature of 
online speech did not necessarily insulate a student from school discipline.75 
Indeed, the Second Circuit has been the frontrunner in analyzing online 
speech as on-campus speech. As early as 1979, the court noted that it could 
  
 66. Kristen Purcell, Trends in Teen Communication and Social Media Use, PEW 
INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.pewInternet. 
org/Presentations/2011/Feb/PIP-Girl-Scout-Webinar.aspx (last accessed Aug. 7, 2013). 
 67. 807 A.2d 847 (2002). 
 68. Id. at 850. 
 69. Id. at 865. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 688.  
 72. E.g., Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (finding that a 
non-explicit Facebook page was not on-campus speech because it was never accessed on-
campus or brought to campus by other students); Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767, 771 
(W.D. Penn. 1976) (holding that an off-campus insult from student to administrator constitut-
ed fighting words, and therefore, the student could be punished); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. 
No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090–91 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (granting an injunction because 
content of speech did not contain violent tendencies and because speech was deemed to be 
off-campus).   
 73. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 
2007). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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“envision a case in which a group of students incite substantial disruption 
within the school from some remote locale,” and the court did not foreclose 
on the idea that this speech would be punishable.76 
Subsequently, in Wisniewski, the court held that the transmission of an 
IM icon,77 depicting a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head with blood 
smears and a teacher’s name, were disruptive at school in accordance with 
Tinker.78 It later reiterated this rule in Doninger v. Niehoff.79 In Doninger, a 
student used her blog to call school administrators “douchebags” and en-
couraged her fellow students to contact the school to “piss-off” an adminis-
trator.80 The student was approached by school officials and asked to apolo-
gize to the administrator in writing, show a copy of the post to her mother, 
and withdraw her candidacy for senior class secretary.81 The Second Circuit 
noted that if the student had distributed a handbill with the identical content 
on school grounds—as opposed to electronically posting it to her blog—the 
case would fall squarely within the Supreme Court’s precedent.82 Despite 
not being physically distributed on school grounds, the court held that the 
speech created a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within the school 
environment, and therefore the school was justified in disciplining her.83  
Initially, the Third Circuit issued conflicting opinions on the issue of 
online student speech that disrupted the campus environment.84 Coinci-
dentally, both cases involved students who used off-campus computers to 
create MySpace85 profile pages that insulted the schools’ principals.86  In J.S. 
ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, a student used MySpace to 
create, on a home computer, a profile that “contained crude content and vul-
  
 76. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ. Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 
(2d Cir. 1979). 
 77. An IM icon is a small image used to represent yourself when you participate in 
online conversations through AOL® Messaging Services. 
 78. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38–39 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)). 
 79. 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 80. Id. at 49. 
 81. Id. at 46.  
 82. Id. at 49 (construing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682–83 
(1986)). 
 83. Id. at 50–51 (citing Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40). 
 84. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301 (3d Cir. 2010), 
vacated & en banc reh’g granted, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. 2010), aff’d in part 
& rev’d in part, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); 
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir. 2010), vacat-
ed & en banc reh’g granted, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. 2010), aff’d in part, 650 
F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  
 85. MySpace is a social networking site that allows users to create individual profiles. 
MYSPACE, www.myspace.com (last visited April 18, 2013).  
 86. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920; Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207–08.  
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gar language, ranging from nonsense and juvenile humor to profanity and 
shameful personal attacks aimed at the principal and his family.”87 In 
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, the student used his 
grandmother’s computer to create a MySpace profile that portrayed the 
middle school principal as admitting to illegal drug use and sexual promis-
cuity.88 Additionally, the schools claimed the content of the profiles caused 
problems for teachers on campus. In Layshock, after learning that the profile 
was being accessed on campus, the administration restricted student access 
to computers.89 In Snyder, two teachers had to quiet their classes because 
students were talking about the profile, and a guidance counselor had to 
proctor a test so another administrator could sit in on the meetings between 
the principal and the student creator.90 Ultimately, both students were disci-
plined by school officials for their actions.91  
After rehearing these cases due to their conflicting nature, the Third 
Circuit ruled that schools officials were not entitled to act upon the student 
speech in Layshock because it found that the speech “did not disturb the 
school environment and was not related to any school sponsored event.”92 
While the Third Circuit did not believe Tinker was applicable in these cases, 
it did not foreclose upon the idea that off-campus, online speech by students 
may be capable of causing substantial disruption, meriting administrative 
action.93 Yet, with the continuing and expanding use of the Internet by stu-
dents, both in and out of the classroom, it is nearly assured that school ad-
ministrators and students alike will continually be forced to confront this 
issue as campus life is increasingly impacted by online speech.  
IV. A MODERN TEST FOR A MODERN AGE 
“In 1969, when the Supreme Court held that students do not ‘shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate,’ there could not have been any serious doubt as to the whereabouts of 
that gate—or the whereabouts of a given student in relation to it.”94 In the 
modern world however, “students adopt email, Web sites, cell phones, and 
instant messaging software to facilitate personal expression,” and “they are 
  
 87. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920. 
 88. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207–08. 
 89. Id. at 209. 
 90. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 922–23. 
 91. Id. at 922; Layshock, 650 F.3d at 210. 
 92. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207. 
 93. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 931–32.  
 94. Kenneth R. Pike, Comment, Locating the Mislaid Gate: Revitalizing Tinker by Re-
pairing Judicial Overgeneralizations of Technologically Enabled Student Speech, 2008 BYU 
L. REV. 971, 972 (2008) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969)). 
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increasingly able to affect others at a distance, blurring the line between on- 
and off-campus speech.”95 When compared to other forms of electronic me-
dia, “the Internet has expanded at an exponential rate, integrating various 
modes of traditional communication, including radio and television, into a 
vast interactive network.”96 Teens are currently the heaviest Internet users, 
and teen cell phone use is also on the rise.97 These statistics suggest that 
because students are on-campus for a significant portion of the day, they 
likely have access to online student speech during school hours through 
school computers or personal internet-capable devices such as cell phones. 
And while internet usage increases, thereby increasing the chances of 
clashes between school administrators and students, there is still not a single 
test currently endorsed by a majority of courts for when online student 
speech may be restricted. The substantial-disruption test in Tinker produces 
undesirable results for both administrators and students.98 This test favors 
punishment for students when their speech, through varying circumstances, 
happens to cause interference in the classroom.99 Yet, the test does not im-
pose punishment for the exact same conduct when circumstances simply do 
not bring the speech within the school environment.100 This means that stu-
dents, when engaging in internet speech, do not have any method to accu-
rately determine whether or not they can be punished for their actions be-
cause some factors, such as if other students print the material and bring it to 
campus, are outside of the speaker’s control. Additionally, the lewd and 
vulgar examination in Fraser is inadequate as it would prohibit a lewd act 
on one side of the schoolhouse gate and expressly allow it on the other, even 
if the speech flowed directly to the same impressionable students.101 This 
type of irrelevant line drawing does not promote good citizenship; instead, it 
merely encourages students to funnel their lewd and vulgar speech to the 
schoolhouse through an off-campus medium in order to avoid the conse-
quences of their actions.  
It is possible, however, to formulate a test using various Supreme Court 
standards and notable internet-speech-case decisions such as those previous-
ly mentioned.102 Students and administrators alike will benefit from a clearly 
drawn student-internet-speech test that balances the administrators’ duty to 
facilitate a harmonious learning environment, which instructs youth as to the 
  
 95. Id. at 972–73. 
 96. James Slevin, THE INTERNET AND SOCIETY 1 (2000).   
 97. Purcell, supra note 66. 
 98. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
 102. See supra Part III. 
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“essential lessons of civil [and] mature conduct,” with students’ First 
Amendment Free Speech rights.103 
A. Off-Campus Student Speech: A Proposed Two-Prong Test 
A test based conjunctively on foreseeability and a student’s objective 
intent will allow student speech with social value to be completely protect-
ed, but it will also allow school administrators to regulate any lewd, threat-
ening, or otherwise un-valuable speech, thus ensuring a healthy educational 
environment for all youths.104 Additionally, such a simple test would allow 
students to evaluate their speech prior to its dissemination and to appreciate 
the consequences of any action they chose to take.  In order to gain an un-
derstanding of its full applicability, this test is demonstrated using the factu-
al scenarios of the Eighth Circuit’s Doe, a case involving off-campus speech 
that did not take place online,105 and the Second Circuit’s Doninger, a case 
directly dealing with off-campus, online student speech.106   
1. First Prong: Foreseeability  
The first step in deciding whether administrators can regulate online 
student speech should be to determine if it is foreseeable (1) that the speech 
will reach school grounds and (2) that the speech is likely to cause substan-
tial disruptions on school grounds. Under the first prong of this proposed 
test, both elements should be foreseeable in order for a finder of fact to pro-
ceed to the second prong. 
The holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bethlehem provides 
guidance as to the first element of the foreseeability prong.107 Bethlehem 
held that speech should be considered on-campus when it is aimed at a spe-
cific school or its personnel and is brought onto the school campus or ac-
cessed at school.108 Therefore, when determining whether the first element 
of the foreseeability prong has been met—that is, whether or not the speech 
was likely to reach campus—courts, administrators and students alike 
should first look to the content and subject matter of the speech. 109  If the 
subject matter involves the school, a school official, a teacher, or another 
  
 103. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
 104. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (noting that “lewd, 
obscene, profane, libelous, and insulting or ‘fighting’” words speech are not an “essential part 
of any exposition of ideas,” and they have only slight social value that can be outweighed by 
“social interest in order and morality”). 
 105. Doe v. Pulaski Co. Spec. Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 106. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 53 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 107. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (2002). 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. 
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student,110 then it is foreseeable that the speech was likely to cross Tinker’s 
now-metaphorical schoolhouse gate and enter the realm of on-campus 
speech. This a careful line to walk, so as to not discourage all speech regard-
ing the school. There would be a difference, for example, if a student’s 
online speech merely concerned an upcoming school dance or pep rally, as 
opposed to a problem with a specific teacher or with a specific school poli-
cy. For the former, a court could reasonably find that the speech concerned a 
topic, a school dance or pep rally, many students are likely to discuss off-
campus. Therefore, it would not be foreseeable for students to fear the 
speech will specifically reach campus. In the latter example, speech con-
cerning a specific problem with a teacher or school policy, should be viewed 
as likely to reach campus, because confrontations with teachers and faculty 
are aimed specifically at the school or its officials.  
Examining Doe under this element of the first prong, a court would 
likely determine that it was unforeseeable that the speech would ever reach 
campus. In Doe, the letter, which threatened a classmate, was written by the 
student, at his home, nearly a year prior to being brought onto campus.111 
The letter was shared with only a single friend who took the letter from the 
student author’s home and subsequently brought it to campus without the 
student author’s knowledge.112 Even though another student was the subject 
of the violent and graphic letter, a court could reasonably conclude that the 
subject matter was limited to a single classmate, it was shared with a single 
classmate, and the student himself did not take any affirmative steps to bring 
the letter, either physically or through electronic transmission to school. 
Therefore, a court would find it was unlikely to reach the school grounds.113  
Under the proposed test, further examination of Doe would be unwarranted, 
and a court could conclude its analysis and hold that any remedial actions 
enforced by school administrators were unnecessary. 
An examination of this prong using the facts of Doninger yields a dif-
ferent result. In Doninger, the student shared her message initially via email 
with a “large number” of email addresses.114 Additionally, the student posted 
her message to her blog with the admitted intention of encouraging students 
who did not receive the initial email message to read it and respond.115 
  
 110. In the future, this test could even expand to help school officials and courts decide 
when online student speech has constituted cyber-bullying. To do so, the test would simply 
need to be applied to the student as opposed to the school. For example, the first prong of the 
test would then become: Is it foreseeable that the speech will (1) reach the targeted student 
and (2) whether that speech is likely to cause harm to that student. 
 111. Doe v. Pulaski Co. Spec. Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. at 616.  
 114. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 115. Id. at 45. 
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Moreover, the subject matter of the speech in Doninger directly concerned 
school officials, whom she called “douchebags,” and the student actively 
encouraged her fellow students to contact the school to “piss-off” a certain 
administrator.116 Due to the subject matter of this speech and the fact that it 
was actively shared and disseminated throughout the student body, a court 
analyzing the speech under the first element of the foreseeability prong 
should reasonably conclude that the speech would reach school grounds. If 
indeed the court found that the first element was satisfied, it should then 
proceed to the second element of the foreseeability test. 
The second element of the foreseeability test, inspired by Tinker, is 
whether the speech was likely to cause significant problems or disruptions to 
the learning environment once it reached campus.117 Naturally, this requires 
school administrators and even the court in instances such as preliminary 
injunctions, to speculate as to what speech will be disruptive. Nevertheless, 
schools and courts should seek to find concrete support for the inference that 
the speech ultimately will or will not cause substantial disruptions. Keeping 
in mind that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not 
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression,”118 courts can ade-
quately predict whether school administrators will have to reroute resources, 
redirect students, or reinstruct teachers in response to the online student 
speech at issue. 
If the speech is purely political, as in Tinker, then schools should ab-
sorb any reasonable disturbances in order to promote the national reverence 
for political speech.119 Notably however, true student political speech should 
not include, as defined by Fraser, content that is lewd and vulgar.120 Be-
cause student rights are not automatically coextensive with the rights of 
adults in other settings, the nature of the speech needs to be appropriate for 
an educational environment.121 The Court’s jurisprudential weaving, there-
fore, gives a high school student in the classroom the right to wear Tinker’s 
armband, but not Cohen’s jacket. 122 
  
 116. Id. at 44–45. 
 117. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
 118. Id. at 508. 
 119. See id. at 514. Although the Court found no disturbances in Tinker, the scenario 
could reasonably be likened to a student wearing a “Pro-Life” or “Pro-Choice” shirt to 
school. While the shirt might inevitably cause some disturbances, such as student complaints, 
Tinker essentially requires the school to permit these disturbances so long as they are not 
substantial. See id. at 510. 
 120. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986). 
 121. See id. at 682. 
 122. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 
1979) (Newman, J., concurring). Justice Newman’s reference to Cohen’s jacket is from the 
case of Cohen v. California, where the speech involved a black leather jacket emblazoned 
with the phrase, “Fuck the Draft.” 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971). 
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Further examination of Doninger demonstrates how a court could de-
termine whether the nature of the speech is appropriate for an educational 
environment. On first glance, the speech in Doninger might appear to be 
purely political—a student merely encouraging her fellow classmates to 
contact administration to voice concerns and frustrations.123 However, as it 
was noted in Fraser, “[t]he undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and 
controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the 
society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of so-
cially appropriate behavior.”124 Therefore, because the student in Doninger 
made the decision to include offensive terms in her call to arms, as well as 
to actively encourage students to directly engage a single administrator125 
with whom the student was in disagreement, a court could reasonably con-
clude that the nature of the student speech was not purely political and, in-
stead, when viewed in the special context of the school environment, was 
plainly offensive.126  
This element of the foreseeability prong will, of course, require an in-
tense and somewhat subjective examination of the facts of any particular 
case. There are markers, however, that will assist courts and administrators 
alike in evaluating the nature of off-campus student speech. If a court deems 
that the student speech is free of such things as true threats,127 fighting 
words,128 and lewd or vulgar content,129 then it can reasonably infer that any 
subsequent disruptions were unforeseeable by the student prior to engaging 
in the speech.  
Furthermore, while this test will prevent some unnecessary litigation, 
other situations will ultimately lead to litigation; therefore, courts should 
also be encouraged to look to what type of reaction the school administra-
tors were forced to take in responding to the speech. A school’s limited re-
sponse might indicate that the nature of the speech was not foreseeably ca-
pable of causing substantial disruption, while a response requiring substan-
  
 123. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 44–47 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 124. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681. 
 125. Students also had the capability to post comments on the blog post, some of which 
specifically attacked the administrator with whom the student was having the disagreement. 
Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45. One commenter and fellow student referred to the administrator as 
a “dirty whore.” Id. 
 126. See id. at 44–47. 
 127. The Court has stated that “[t]rue threats encompass those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 
360 (2003). 
 128. Fighting words have been classified by the Court as words that “which by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 129. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685–86. 
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tial reallocation of teachers’ or administrators’ time might indicate that it 
was foreseeable that the nature of the speech would substantially disrupt 
campus life. Returning to Doninger, the school administrators were forced 
to respond to an increased number of phone calls and additionally “were 
forced to miss or [arrive] late to several school-related activities” as a result 
of handling the disruption.130 
In sum, once it is determined that the content or subject matter of the 
speech is school-based, and thus likely to enter the bounds of the school, 
then it should be determined whether the speech’s context contains the types 
of speech society would like schools to discourage children from using.131 
Additionally, if the case does find its way to a courtroom, judges should 
look to see whether the speech stopped class time, interfered with the goals 
and missions of the school, or forced a reallocation of resources and staff. If 
so, then a court could reason that a disruption took place.   
2. Second Prong: Objective Intent 
After finding that it is foreseeable that a student’s internet speech will 
reach campus and cause substantial disruption, a court should then look to 
whether there was an objective intent for the speech to incite students, facul-
ty, or administrators. An objective test is important in this instance because 
it is likely that students who face expulsion, suspension or other punish-
ments for their speech would, if given the opportunity, use lack of intent as a 
get-out-of-jail-free card. Still, without some indication of the speaker’s in-
tent, it would be possible for schools to override a student’s rights far too 
easily. 
While Tinker emphasized the location of the speech and speaker, in the 
internet age, location of the speech includes the medium used by the speak-
er.132 Therefore, in order to adequately determine whether the student had an 
objective intent to cause disruption, a court should turn to the medium the 
student chooses to disperse his message. If the online speech occurs in a 
public forum, such as social networking sites, or a private form that is ac-
tively shared with fellow students, such as an email with instructions to for-
ward it to other students, then a court should hold that the student possessed 
the requisite objective intent to cause disruptions on school grounds. If, on 
the other hand, a student merely posts to a personal online blog that she does 
not actively promote or encourage her fellow students to read, or sends a 
single e-mail message to a close friend, then a court could conclude that the 
  
 130. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46. 
 131. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
 132. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
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student did not intend for the speech, regardless of its nature, to reach cam-
pus and become disruptive. 
A continued examination of Doninger demonstrates that the student 
likely possessed the requisite intent to cause substantial disruptions. The 
student chose two mediums through which to disseminate her message—
mass email and a publicly accessible blog with commenting enabled.133 The-
se mediums demonstrate that the student desired the speech to be heard by 
as many of her classmates as possible because the mediums actively sought 
to include or enlist fellow students.134 As a result, a court could easily infer 
an intent to disrupt. In contrast, if Doninger had chosen instead to email or 
message her complaint to only a few close friends through Facebook,135 but 
not necessarily encourage them to spread the message along, a court could 
find it reasonable that she was merely expressing her frustrations through 
the Internet, much like as if she had been passing a note to a friend in a 
school hallway.  
This two-prong, content-context-medium-focused test, will guide 
courts, school administrators, and students in determining what off-campus 
student speech can be regulated by evaluating four important factors of the 
speech. This test conclusively addresses the following: (1) to whom the 
speech is relayed; (2) the content of the speech; (3) the nature of the speech; 
and (4) how the speaker chooses to disperse his or her message. In order for 
online student speech to be actionable by school administrators, both prongs 
of this test must be met, and therefore, all speech with regard to the same 
factors. Additionally, the school should have the burden of demonstrating 
that the student speech in question was both foreseeably capable of disrupt-
ing campus life, and that the student’s choice of medium indicates that he 
had the objective intent to do so.  
B. Additional and Future Applications 
While this test addresses student online speech that targets administra-
tors, as previously illustrated, it is also flexible in nature and can adapt to 
  
 133. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 44–47. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Courts will have to use a reasonableness test to essentially “draw the line” in some 
situations. If a student, for example, emailed three friends a court might find the student did 
not possess the requisite intent. In contrast, a student who emailed five close friends might be 
found to have possessed the objective intent of disrupting campus. The Objective Intent 
Prong should be view conjunctively with both elements of the Foreseeability Prong. There-
fore, a message with highly inflammatory content, such as a teacher’s perceived sexuality, 
may not be as tolerated by a court. Likewise, if the context of the speech is perhaps vaguely 
lewd or vulgar, such as comments on a teacher’s breasts, a court might tolerate the message 
being privately shared online with a few more friends than in other circumstances.  
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address any type of off-campus speech, via the Internet or otherwise, which 
ultimately could have implications for on-campus life. 
1. The Proposed Test Is Also Applicable for Variations of Off-
Campus Student Speech 
In addition to online speech, this test can also be applied to other forms 
of off-campus student speech, such as the letter in Doe.136 Additionally, the 
test is versatile enough to provide guidance for less traditional or technolog-
ical forms of student speech. The test would, for example, allow students to 
picket their schools off campus in order to show disapproval of some admin-
istrative decision or policy because of the pure political nature of that 
speech.137 For the same reason, student protests, walk outs, or marches 
would also be protected under this proposed test.138 Yet, this test would al-
low school administrators to take action when students use off-campus 
speech to target, or bully, other students.139 As the Internet increasingly pro-
vides students with more outlets to bully their fellow classmates, “adminis-
trators are becoming increasingly alarmed” and schools must take steps to 
“preserve an appropriate pedagogical environment.”140 Thus, this two-prong 
test would allow administrators to do so, as the content and the nature of this 
kind of speech would likely indicate that it is foreseeable that the speech 
would reach campus and cause substantial disruptions and that the student 
possessed the objective intent to cause disruption on-campus.141 
2. Inevitable Advances in the Internet and Technology   
Because technology changes so rapidly, it is necessary for any test to 
have the ability to mold to these inevitable changes. Any test adopted by the 
United States Supreme Court should have broad applicability in order to 
stand this test of time. The proposed two-prong test meets these require-
ments. 
  
 136. See Doe v. Pulaski Co. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 624–25 (8th Cir. 2002).  
 137. See, e.g., Michael Miller, Students Picket Outside H.B. High: Leaders of Daylong 
Protest Say School Puts Too Much Stress on Grades, Too Little on Creativity. ‘I Refuse to be 
a Sheep,’ One Sign Reads, HUNTINGTON BEACH INDEP. (Nov. 9, 2011), http://articles.hb 
independent.com/2011-11-09/entertainment/tn-hbi-1110-protest-20111107_1_students-picket- 
protest-monday-morning-grades/2.   
 138. See, e.g., Chris Welch, Lee High School Students March in Protest of Huntsville 
Superintendent’s Proposal to Change School Name, THE HUNTSVILLE TIMES (Nov. 3, 2011, 
8:20 AM), http://blog.al.com/breaking/2011/11/lee_high_school_students_prote.html.   
 139. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 576–77 (4th Cir. 2011).  
 140. Id. at 577. 
 141. See supra Part IV.A.1–2. 
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While the Third Circuit’s cases, Snyder and Layshock, both involved 
MySpace pages created by students, this test would just as easily apply to 
Facebook pages or groups.142 New types of online interaction are always 
gaining or fading in popularity, and this test would be capable of adapting in 
response.143  
Even though Facebook maintains high popularity, Twitter, created in 
2006, is gaining rapid popularity and has even contributed to important 
world events such as the Arab Spring.144 It is possible, therefore, to conceive 
that a court will soon be asked to determine whether a student can be pun-
ished for a “tweet,” a YouTube video, or some other new medium of online 
expression that has yet to gain traction or even be invented. Because this 
proposed two-prong test evaluates four factors, both broadly and concisely, 
it will continue to adapt to upcoming changes in technologies. 
C. Possibility of Supreme Court Intervention 
The Supreme Court of the United States has already refused to review 
Doninger out of the Second Circuit.145 Most recently, it has refused to hear 
Snyder and Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools,146 cases involving online 
bullying from the Third and Fourth Circuits, respectively, as well.147 The 
sheer number of these cases infiltrating the lower courts should encourage 
the Supreme Court of the United States to accept certiorari in a case soon 
and to set a clear standard that lower courts can use to address the substan-
tial and continuing concerns of off-campus and online student speech.   
D. Dangers of Not Adopting a Broad, Yet Specific, Internet Speech Test 
for Student Speech Cases 
If, or when, the Supreme Court takes up one of the many student 
speech case writs, it will have three options before it. First, the Court could 
choose to analyze the single case on its individual merits and essentially 
decide that all student internet speech cases should be analyzed on a case-
  
 142. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 
2011); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 143. MySpace formerly held the highest number of users, but that honor now belongs to 
Facebook. See Michael Arrington, Facebook Now Nearly Twice The Size of MySpace 
Worldwide, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 22, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/01/22/facebook-now-
nearly-twice-the-size-of-myspace-worldwide/. 
 144. Carol Haung, Facebook and Twitter Key to Arab Spring Uprisings: Report, THE 
NAT’L (June 6, 2011), http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/facebook-and-twitter-key-
to-arab-spring-uprisings-report. 
 145. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 146. 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 147. Id.; J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011).  
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by-case basis. This would be unwise as it would leave the current circuit 
split unaddressed. Moreover, it would not provide guidance as to how courts 
should handle these cases in the future or to what extent administrators can 
regulate speech without fear of lawsuit.  
Second, the Court could choose to analyze student internet speech un-
der the old standards of Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, Morse, or some combi-
nation of the four. While this option is certainly preferable to the previous 
one, it still leaves much to be desired.  Even if Tinker’s substantially disrup-
tive standard works in one case, there is no guarantee that it will work in a 
majority of others. As technology continues to expand and becomes more 
widely used in the classroom, the odds that more internet speech cases will 
not fit squarely within the bounds of Tinker or Fraser become too great. 
This option, much like the first, still leaves school administrators and stu-
dents without viable options for evaluating student internet speech at its 
source, and it fails to potentially eliminate unnecessary intervention by the 
judicial system. 
Third, the Court has the option of adopting a specific student internet 
speech test. This is the only option before the Court that would not only 
adequately work for whichever case is granted certiorari, but would also 
provide a potentially long-lasting remedy that multiple courts, administra-
tors, and students could use in evaluating this type of speech. While many 
tests exist, and undoubtedly more will surface in the interim, the two-prong, 
content-context-medium focused approach this note proposes would provide 
a stable yet flexible measure by which administrators, students, and courts 
would substantially benefit. 
Administrators would have an opportunity to more easily assess speech 
before deciding whether it merits punishment. More importantly, adminis-
trators would be able to take a sigh of relief, as a clear and applicable stand-
ard would assuage fears that every detention hall or suspension will lead to 
lawsuits. Therefore, it is possible that administrators will be less likely to 
advocate for limiting internet interactions and capabilities for students and 
teachers.148 
Students will benefit from the adoption of this test in two ways. First, 
they will be given guidance as to how to self-monitor their own behavior. 
While it is true that parents are responsible for the rearing of their children, 
it is also true that much goes unnoticed, especially when children have 
smart-phones, laptops, and access to the internet on tablets. Therefore, a 
  
 148. See Ryan Lytle, Student-Teacher Social Media Restrictions Get Mixed Reactions, 
US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (Aug. 10, 2011), http://education.usnews.rankingsandreviews 
.com/education/high-schools/articles/2011/08/10/student-teacher-social-media-restrictions-
get-mixed-reactions; Jennifer Preston, Rules to Stop Pupil and Teacher From Getting Too 
Social Online, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/business 
/media/rules-to-limit-how-teachers-and-students-interact-online.html?_r=4. 
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clear standard would allow students to address the possible consequences of 
their speech prior to its dissemination and, hopefully, would encourage 
speech that is productive, political, beneficial, or responsible to society. Se-
cond, students will benefit if administrators can relax and loosen the reins on 
Internet usage. If administrators are less worried about lawsuits because they 
can clearly cut out improper speech with prompt attention and discipline, 
then students are likely to benefit by increased access to the Internet while 
on-campus and less stringent standards regarding their interaction with fac-
ulty while off-campus.  
Finally, courts will benefit by having a test that will stand the test of 
time. Whether the case before it deals with a tweet, a viral video, a blog 
comment,149 a Facebook group,150or another aspect of technology not yet 
conceivable, a court will have a clearly defined, yet flexible, standard by 
which to evaluate the speech. This type of security saves judicial resources 
and time and allows for cases to move as swiftly as possible through the 
justice system.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The proposed two-prong student internet speech test would provide a 
better and more predictable framework for students, administrators, and 
courts to use. As the Internet and social media networks continue to expand, 
and as more and more schools begin and continue to use technology both 
inside and outside of the classroom, it becomes even more important for 
both students and administrators to have clearly defined parameters of stu-
dents’ First Amendment speech rights.  
Because schools play an essential role in molding young American 
minds, they are tasked with the difficult, and often conflicting, duties of 
empowering student voices while also moderating student conduct. This 
task, while daunting, can be achieved if courts opt to use the proposed two-
prong test on a consistent basis to evaluate off-campus student speech. This 
test will continue to encourage the types of rights recognized by the Su-
preme Court in Tinker, while also encouraging students to voice their First 
  
 149. See generally D.C. v. R.R., 182 Cal. App. 4th 1190 (2010) (addressing a student suit 
against a fellow student alleging statutory violations under California’s hate crime laws and 
common law claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress following 
comments posted to a student’s blog that threatened the student’s life, and included profanity 
laced insults regarding the student’s perceived sexuality). 
 150. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2011). In this 
case, a student brought suit against his high school alleging that he was a victim of sexual 
harassment as prohibited by Title IX.  See id. at 862. A portion of the student’s allegations 
stemmed from a student-created Facebook page called, “Every One [sic] That Hates Billy 
Wolfe,” which contained a photo-shopped image of the student’s face on a figure wearing a 
green fairy costume with the word “HOMOSEXUAL” written on it. Id. 
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Amendment rights in a way that is both productive and civil. Even though 
the Constitution affords protection outside Tinker’s gate to hateful and mor-
ally reprehensible speech, such as that used by the members of Westboro 
Baptist Church in protesting military funerals, it is a safe bet that no public 
school in America seeks to actively promote such vile and patently offensive 
conduct among its future graduates.151 
A clear test should promote and encourage a student’s First Amend-
ment rights while also instilling within them a healthy distaste for the type 
of lewd and offensive conduct first prohibited in schools by Fraser.152 This 
two-prong test will enable America’s public schools to effectively deal with 
the increasing number of these cases while also maintaining the respect of 
students everywhere.  
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 151. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 152. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). 
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